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AT DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE IN
THE UNITED STATES*
LEONARD R. MELLON,** JOAN E. JACOBY,*** AND
MARION A. BREWER****
I.

INTRODUCTION

The broad discretionary power of the American prosecutor subjects
the office to criticism and enshrouds the prosecutorial function in controversy. However, the criticism usually is overbroad and lacks factual
support. Is a first offender convicted of aggravated assault treated differently in Brooklyn, New York, than in New Orleans, Louisiana? Is a
shoplifting suspect found with a gun in her purse treated the same in
Boulder, Colorado, as in Detroit, Michigan? Such questions have gone
unanswered and, indeed, unasked, by any comprehensive survey of
prosecutorial discretion in America.
This study examines the spectrum of state prosecutorial styles in
America's urban areas. Our purpose is to identify those differences
which affect the uniformity, the quality, and the equality of justice administered by local prosecutors.
In order to examine and analyze policy and the dimensions of uniformity and consistency in prosecutorial decisionmaking, ten geographically dispersed and otherwise diverse, large urban prosecutors' offices
participated in this study.1 This Article outlines some findings and con* The data presented and the views expressed are solely the responsibility of the authors
and do not reflect the official positions, policies, or points of view of the National Institute of
Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, or the
Department of Justice.

** Research Associate, Bureau of Social Science Research, Inc.; Deputy Executive Director, Jefferson Institute for Justice Studies; LL.B., Georgetown University; B.S.F.S., School of
Foreign Service, Georgetown University.
*** Executive Director, Jefferson Institute for Justice Studies; Adjunct Research Associate,

Bureau of Social Science Research, Inc.; M.A., American University; B.A., Boston University.
**** Clerk to Judge Zita Weinshenck, United States District Court for Colorado; J.D.,
Georgetown University; B.A., Stanford University.

I The participating prosecutorial offices, in order of jurisdictional size were: Wayne
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clusions of Phase One of the prosecutorial decisionmaking research project conducted by the Bureau of Social Science Research (BSSR).
The research findings reveal several striking patterns. First, in some
cases the external environment imposes substantial limits on a prosecutor's ability to act. Second, the prosecutorial policy in force, perhaps
dictated in part by the environment, significantly affects the so-called
"discretionary" decisions made by the prosecutors' offices studied.
Third, the selection and implementation through office organization of
a prosecution policy, or the acceptance of an environmentally mandated
office organizational structure is extremely significant: it represents a
discretionary judgment. The importance of organizational discretion
hitherto was unrecognized because no prior study has attempted an
analysis of major prosecutors offices' practices from case intake to postconviction disposition. This research seeks to fill that gap.
The study concludes that prosecutors in America cannot be discussed in universal terms. Whether in a phillipic about unbridled
prosecutorial discretion, a diatribe against plea bargaining, or a learned
discourse on the charging decision, most commentators fail to recognize
that prosecutors are hardly homogenous. This study reveals that prosecution in American states is marked by diversity. The differences in
prosecution policy are often mandated by environmental factors over
which the individual prosecutor has no control. Through an analysis of
the external factors which prosecutors cannot control, this study explains how they exercise discretion, and why they execute policy that
often differs significantly from one jurisdiction to another.
This Article will begin by considering why policy became an issue
in the debate over prosecutorial discretion. A brief description of the
study's methodology prefaces a discussion of the policies and organizational styles identified. This Article concludes with a review of the continuing aspects of the BSSR research project on prosecutorial
decisionmaking.
II.

PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION

Discretion is an essential component of the American system of
criminal justice. It is the element which makes the system uniquely
American-the flexible and individualized treatment of persons accused
of crimes whereby each accused suspect's rights to confrontation, counsel, and a speedy trial, among other things, are secured. Yet this discreCounty (Detroit), Michigan; Kings County (Brooklyn), New York; Eleventh Judicial Circuit
(Miami), Florida; San Diego County, California; King County (Seattle), Washington; Orleans Parish, Louisiana; 31st Judicial Circuit (Crown Point), Indiana; Salt Lake County, Utah;
The City of Norfolk, Virginia; and 20th District (Boulder), Colorado.
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tionary element is also the shibboleth of critics who question whether a
system which handles like cases differently provides due process and
equal protection to the defendant.
Policy as articulated by rules, regulations, standards, and guidelines
is a key to measuring abuse of discretion. As Kenneth Culp Davis observed:
Discretion is a tool only when properly used; like an axe, it can be a
weapon for mayhem or murder. In a government of men and of laws, the
portion that is a government of men, like a malignant cancer, often tends
to stifle the portion that is a government of laws. Perhaps nine-tenths of
system flows from discretion and perhaps only oneinjustice in our legal
2
tenth from rules.
Encouraged by Davis and other critics 3 during the past decade,
both the American Bar Association (ABA) and the National District Attorneys Association (NDAA) promulgated standards relating to prosecution.4 The ABA standards address the ethical, professional, and legal
responsibilities of the prosecutor in the charging process and emphasize
the requirement for policy manuals to encourage the uniform and consistent application of policy. 5 The NDAA standards attempt to acknowledge diversity in that the problems faced by a one-man
prosecutor's office differ significantly from those confronted by a large
urban office staffed by three hundred or more attorneys. Nevertheless,
both sets of guidelines support the proposition that a carefully planned
and articulated policy is essential as a guide for the prosecutor in the
exercise of discretion.
This is not to say that the ABA or the NDAA standards give prosecutors rigid rules to follow in making discretionary decisions. According
to the ABA, "[t]he public interest is best served and evenhanded justice
best dispensed not by a mechanical application of the 'letter of the law'
but by a flexible and individualized application of its norms through the
exercise of the trained discretion of the prosecutor as an administrator of
' '6
justice.
2 K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 25 (1971).
3 See generaly id. See also F. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUS-

(1969); Halligan, A PoliticalEconomy of ProsecutorialDiscretion, 5 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 2, 4 (1977); Reiss, DicretionavJustice, in HANDBOOK OF CRIMINOLOGY 693 (D.
Glaser ed. 1974); Rosett, Discretion,Seveit, and Legality n CrinminalJustice, 46 S. CAL. L. REV.
12, 16 (1972).
4 ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE
FUNCTION (Approved Draft 1971) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS]; NDAA NATIONAL
PROSECUTION STANDARDS (1977). In the federal system, the United States Attorney General
recently released guidelines to channel the discretion of federal prosecutors. See UNITED
STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION (July 28, 1980).
5 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, § 2.5, at 64-66.
6 Id. at 94.
PECT WITH A CRIME
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The general interest in guidelines encouraged a spate of legislation
to curb the exercise of discretion by the sentencing judges. The debate
over mandatory sentencing laws served both to highlight the importance
of policy to govern discretion and to increase criticism of how the prosecutor exercised his. Senator Edward Kennedy observes that the
problems which stem from uncontrolled judicial discretion "are
subordinate to a fundamental flaw in our current system: the lack of an
articulated philosophy of correction that expresses the general purposes
and goals underlying the sentencing of federal offenders." '7 Detractors of
the new laws try to pin the problem on the prosecutor:
[B]ecause it is always easier to beat dead horses than to tame living ones,
many commentators still direct their criticisms at the unfettered discretion
of the sentencing judge. In continuing to whip this crippled horse, critics
themselves may have donned a set of intellectual blinders that causes them
to miss other less visible variables, such as the role of the prosecutor ....8
Perhaps it was easier to attack discretion at sentencing, the end of
the process, than at the gatekeeping threshold where the prosecutor
made the charging decision. Sentencing decisions are relatively quantifiable: it is simple to count convicts, parolees, and those on probation.
Tabulating the cases settled, pled out, dropped, or never charged, and
understanding the reasons for those decisions is a monumental and for
the most part previously unattempted task. For decades generalized attacks focused on the nature of the prosecutors' power 9 but no systematic
information was available on how prosecutors abused their power. Nor
were statistics available measuring how many assistants made discretionary decisions as their superiors would have or followed whatever directions they might have received regarding case handling.
Commentators assumed the prosecutor had discretion but it was not
clear how he exercised it. No one presumed that in some cases the prosecutor's actions might be attributable to circumstances beyond his control.
7 Kennedy, Towarda New System of CriminalSentencing: Law with Order, 16 AM. CRIM. L.
REV.353, 364 (1979).
8 Coffee, RepressedIssuesof Sentencing: Accountability, PredictabilityandEqualityin the Era of the
Sentencing Commission, 66 GEo. L. J. 975, 979 (1978).
9 Nearly thirty years ago, then Attorney General, later Justice Robert Jackson, observed:
The prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other person
in America. His discretion is tremendous. He can have persons investigated and, if he is
that kind of person, he can have this done to the tune of public statements and veiled
and unveiled intimations. . . He may dismiss the case before trial, in which case the
defense never has a chance to be heard. . . . If the prosecutor is obliged to choose his
cases, it follows that he can choose his defendants.
K. DAVIs, .tupra note 2, at 190.
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THE STUDY

Pursuant to an LEAA funded grant, BSSR undertook a study of
prosecutorial decisionmaking and the effect of the external environment
on prosecution in the United States through an examination of ten jurisdictions.' 0 BSSR attempted to select sites randomly while attaining geographic dispersal and diversity among the sites selected. The format of
the study required that the prosecutor be willing to participate; that his
office keep statistical records which could be utilized by the research
team;"I and that the jurisdiction serve a population of at least 150,000
persons.

Accordingly, the prosecutors volunteering to participate in the
study represented large urban areas ranging in population size from
165,000 to more than 2.5 million. The participating offices presented
ten state environments for examination and as many different local
12
criminal justice system settings.
10 L.E.A.A. Grant No. 78-NI-AX-0006, from the National Institute of Law Enforcement
and Criminal Justice/Law Enforcement Assistance Administration ("National Institute")
funded this project. Reports of the findings to date include: J. JACOBY & L. MELLON, POLICY ANALYSIS FOR PROSECUTION (1979) [hereinafter cited as PAP]; J. JACOBY & L. MELLON,
POLICY ANALYSIS FOR PROSECUTION EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (1979) [hereinafter cited as Ex.
SUM.]; J. JACOBY, E. RATLEDGE & S. TURNER, RESEARCH ON PROSECUTORIAL DECISIONMAKING PHASE 1: FINAL REPORT (1979).
11 A lack of quantitative information hampered the study. Although all participants kept
records to which the research team had free access, among the ten offices studied only one, the
Wayne County (Detroit) Prosecuting Attorney, had case disposition data available in a form
which could be readily incorporated into the study by the research team. As a result, quantitative information to support the qualitative assessments made by the researchers was, for the
most part, simply unavailable.
12 The following table offers further information about the participating offices and the
communities in which they are based. Table source: PAP, supra note 10, at 155; Ex. SUM.
supra note 10, at 29.
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1,335.1
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1

Kings Co.,
NY

2,411.0

Brooklyn

2,411.0

39,500 305

0

San Diego
Co., CA
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San Diego
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8,500

153

5

19

Inf. A.C. Two-Tier Yes No

Dade Co.,
FL

1,445.7

Miami
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11,000

100

0

26

Inf. P.D. Two-Tier Yes No

King Co.,
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1,149.2
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6,300
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Inf. P.D. Two-Tier Yes Yes

44
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1 Ind. P.D. Two-Tier No Yes
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The researchers included members of the project staff and consultants combining experience in law, management, systems analysis, prosecution, statistics, and related areas of law and social science. 13 For site
visits to each jurisdiction, researchers formed teams of three to five persons depending-on the size of the office. At each site one individual
collected quantitative data. The other team members gathered descriptive or qualitative information through lengthy interviews with decisionmakers in each office and with other members of the local criminal
justice system.14 Frequently, articulated perceptions of what was hapSUMMARY OF SELECTED CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS
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NOTE:

Felony caseload figures are estimated figures.
a All assistants in Lake County are part-time employees.
b Wayne County has two separate systems. In Detroit, the Recorders Court is a unified court; in the
outlying county areas, there is a two-tiered system.
c Lake County has two trial level courts of general jurisdiction, and two lower level courts of
overlapping limited jurisdiction.

13 The BSSR Project Staff researchers included: Joan E. Jacoby, Leonard R. Mellon,
Bruce Dunning, Sharon Biederman, and Kevin Brosch. Consultants included: Dan L. Johnston, Edward C. Ratledge, Stanley H. Turner, and William Wessel.
14 All site visits occurred during a six-month period: March through August of 1978. The
initial phase of each site visit consisted of a thorough interview with the chief prosecuting
attorney.and his top policymakers. Each interview normally took one and one-half to two
hours and featured two researchers asking questions of one decisionmaker. Researchers took
written notes as unobtrusively as possible because tape recording is expensive, time-consuming, and considered by some to be fear-provoking. In order to preserve the clarity and accuracy of the written observations, at the end of each day researchers reviewed their notes for.
(1) statements or areas needing verification; (2) comprehensibility; (3) completeness, noting
exclusions or omissions; (4) need of additional information; and (5) the development of additional lines of questioning. Daily transcription occurred when possible or necessary. Researchers used a standardized form for final reports.
Each on-site visit concluded with a final session with the chief prosecutor. The researchers used this meeting to clarify additional policy questions, to verify the prosecutor's policy or
the researchers' perceptions thereof, to explain how the information would be used as docu-
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pening in the prosecutors' offices did not coincide precisely with what
researchers observed to be the actual practice.
The interviews during the on-site visits identified the predominant
policy of the office. In addition, the teams examined and described the
communication, transmittal, and implementation procedures for the of-

fice's policy.15 This involved scrutiny of the overall organization of the
office and an analysis of procedures at each step of the decisionmaking
process from case intake through post-conviction activity.

Moreover, team members strived to be alert to the effect of the external environment on the office. Pursuant to the instructions for on-site
observations, the researchers noted where environmental constraints af-

fected the prosecutor's policy and actions. While post-visit comparative
analysis was the source of some observations, the instructions en-

couraged sensitivity to the environmental issue from the beginning.
mentation for a policy and procedures manual, and to seek further assistance with the continuing aspects of the research project.
15 Researchers observed the following formal and informal methods of policy transmittal
in the offices studied.

WRITTEN

ARTICULATED SETTINGS

NONARTICULATED SETTINGS

AND MEDIA

AND MEDIA

Policy documents
Operating procedures, guidelines,
instructions
Administration procedures, guidelines, instructions
Letters and memoranda

Letters and memoranda

Recurring reports

UNWRITTEN

Reports specified for exceptional
situations

Unspecified exceptional reports

Staff meetings/conferences

Casual conferences:

Verbal reports in specified
situations

Rap sessions
Watercooler/coffee cup meetings
Hallway meetings and drop-ins
Lunches
After-work cocktail hour
Social occasions
Car pool conversations

BSSR researchers concluded that the free flow of information tends to produce greater organizational effectiveness, which is to say, more decisions consistent with an articulated decisionmaking policy. They developed the following model for communication maximization
within an office.
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DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF ON-SITE FINDINGS

An earlier BSSR research project highlighted the importance of
clear prosecutorial policy guidelines at screening or intake, the threshold
of the criminal justice process. Intake is generally where a prosecutor's
assistants decide whether to drop the case or to file charges, and if the
latter course is selected, which charges to file:
Since the charging decisions are the first expression of prosecutorial
policy, they must be consistent with what the chief prosecutor hopes to
achieve and made uniform by the charging assistants. Arbitrary and capricious decisions can be made by assistants if the prosecutor's policy is not
clearly stated and if means are not developed for 6internal review by those
ultimately responsible for the decisions reached.'
The researchers observed that the prosecutor's policy governing intake sets the tone for the subsequent handling of all cases accepted for
prosecution. They identified and classified four basic policy types or
models: Legal Sufficiency, System Efficiency, Trial Sufficiency, and Defendant Rehabilitation. The current study confirmed the existence of
these policy types and revealed that some prosecutors transfer, or suffer
the transfer of, their decisionmaking power (usually to the police) at the
screening or intake stage. This transfer results in variations in office
structure which may significantly affect the achievement of the chief
prosecutor's objectives in a given office. Researchers also found a unit
style of operation in some offices wherein each individual assistant had
decisionmaking autonomy. Some offices utilized a combination of policies to effectuate the chief prosecutor's objectives; in other offices several
different policy styles operated together as the process of switching from
one type to another was accomplished. The analytical framework expanded to include the unit and transfer style variations. The following
briefly describes the policy types and variations discovered in both rePOTENTIAL COMMUNICATION CHANNELS
P OSECUTO

(CHIEF ASSISTANT)

-

H

(CHIEF ASSISTANT)

ASSISTANTS..~

ASSSTANTS

PARALEGAL

PARALEGAL

J. JAcOBY,

THE PROSECUTOR'S CHARGING DECISION: A PoLicY PERSPEcrvE 4 (National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice 1977).
16

60
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17
search projects.

A.

LEGAL SUFFICIENCY

The Legal Sufficiency policy is probably the simplest from an organizational perspective. At charging, the case is examined primarily for
legal elements and not necessarily for any constitutional or evidentiary
issues that may subsequently affect the course of a trial (or any alternative disposition). If the initial complaint (usually a police report) is legally insufficient, that is, the evidence reported does not establish the
crime charged, the attorney making the charging decision either orders
additional investigation or drops the case.
This policy operated effectively in two very different, large urban
offices: Wayne County (Detroit), Michigan, and San Diego, California.
Two other jurisdictions participating in the study also displayed elements of a legal sufficiency policy.18 Thus, four of the five largest offices
studied either elected or accepted a Legal Sufficiency approach.
Because screening is incomplete under the Legal Sufficiency policy,
a large number of cases meet the minimal requirements of the office and
are accepted for prosecution. This could pose serious problems in De17 It should be noted that prosecutors did not think in terms of the strict policy categories
set out in the study's typology. The models are an attempt to categorize the policy perceptions of individual prosecutors.
The following chart illustrates the categorization of the participating offices by policy
style.
INTAKE
STYLE
OFFICE

POLICY

SrrE

Legal Sufficiency-

Wayne County (Detroit), Michigan
*King County (Seattle), Washington

System Efficiency-

*Kings County (Brooklyn), New York

San Diego County, California

Defendant
RehabilitationTrial Sufficiency-

Boulder, Colorado
Orleans Parish (New Orleans),
Louisiana

TRANSFER

Dade County (Miami), Florida
Norfolk, Virginia

UNIT

Salt Lake City, Utah
Lake County (Gary), Indiana

Table Source: PAP, supra note 10, at 204; Ex. SUM, supra note 10, at 32.
* Undergoing change.
18 Kings County (Brooklyn), New York, discussed at section IV B infra, and King County
(Seattle), Washington, discussed at section IV E infra. Brooklyn made the transition to a
System Efficiency policy while the Seattle office suffered from a lack of clear policy.
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troit but for two factors-a state statute and the prosecutor's carefully
conceived response.
By Michigan law,' 9 the prosecutor must approve the issuance of all
arrest warrants. Thus, prosecuting attorneys in Wayne County have an
opportunity to screen each case at the earliest possible time. In order to
make this review as effective as possible the Warrant Section staff consists of five experienced assistant prosecutors, some with more than ten
years' service in the office. This arrangement weeds out weak cases
before the suspects are even arrested.
As the Warrant Section staffing pattern demonstrates, the Wayne
County Prosecuting Attorney's office appears efficiently structured and
organized with well developed and documented office procedures. Such
organization is essential because the Prosecuting Attorney suffers severe
funding deficiencies and, as a result, personnel shortages exist in almost
every aspect of his activities. As compared to the national average of
100 felony cases per assistant per year, 20 Wayne County assistant prosecutors carry an average of 143 cases each. Only three clerks helped
process the 18,000 cases handled in Recorder's Court, the felony court in
Detroit. Nevertheless, the Prosecuting Attorney manages his caseload
without an apparent backlog in a most adverse environment created by
the shortage of personnel.
In contrast to Wayne County, the San Diego District Attorney has
vast resources available and employs a large staff of 135 attorneys, 121
investigators, and more than 200 clerical and support staff. Yet despite
its large staff, San Diego is one jurisdiction in which plea bargaining is a
vital dispositional tool. 2 ' Extensive use of plea bargaining is common in

a Legal Sufficiency office because it is a necessary tool for eliminating
many cases from a fixed capacity court system. In San Diego, for example, charging decisions are made so that some lesser fiat sentence is available to a pleading defendant rather than a single, maximum, "top"
count. A San Diego Assistant District Attorney discussing this practice
indicated that although the office recommends sentences, it does not
19 MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.860 (Callaghan 1978).
20 See J. JACOBY, J. ETHRIDGE & J. BOURLAND, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NA-

TIONAL CENTER FOR PROSECUTION MANAGEMENT (Nat'l Center for Prosecution Manage-

ment 1972).
21 Approximately 90% of all felony cases are disposed of in San Diego by guilty pleas.
Unlike most of the other offices participating in the study, cases are negotiated not in terms of
reduced charges, but in terms of whether the District Attorney will oppose "local time." This
is an important consideration to the defendant since under California law, CAL PENAL CODE
§ 17(b)(4) (West 1970), a prosecutor can file certain crimes as either felonies or misdemeanors.
Sentences in such cases can be served either in the state prison or the county jail. Thus, the
prosecutor's "no objection to local time" is often as persuasive in plea negotiations as is his
decision to charge certain felonies which carry determinate sentences.
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sentence bargain. "We charge bargain," he said. However, another Assistant District Attorney in the same office observed, "In view of determinate sentencing, we are sentence bargaining when we dismiss counts
and in effect strike allegations in connection with enhancement of punishment and charges."
This is an ironic comment on the position that determinate sentencing is a way of curbing discretion on the part of the judiciary. Often, as
in San Diego, the discretion is not curbed; rather, it is transferred to the'
prosecutor who uses it in charging.
The availability of enhancements in both Detroit and San Diego
highlights the significance of the prosecutor's charging decision. An enhancement requires the automatic imposition of a greater punishment
under certain circumstances. The classic illustration is the example of a
subject arrested for a burglary of a dwelling while in possession of a
revolver. In most jurisdictions he can be charged with burglary and the
possession of a dangerous weapon or firearm. However, these charges
and their attendant possible punishment can be enhanced in those jurisdictions which make it a crime to be armed at the time a felony is committed.
Under California law, enhanced charges may be imposed for the
infliction of grave bodily injury, in instances where the defendant is
armed, or where the defendant inflicts great injury.2 2 Michigan law, on
the other hand, mandates an automatic two-year prison sentence upon
conviction for a crime committed while in possession of a firearm. 23 An
assistant prosecutor in Detroit illustrated the difficulty posed by
mandatory sentences with this example. A seventeen-year-old girl (first
offender) was arrested for shoplifting. In the course of the search incident to arrest, police found a pistol at the bottom of her purse. The fact
that the weapon was in her possession mandated a two-year jail term
upon charge and conviction. The mandatory nature of these laws has
produced new demands for prosecutorial inventiveness to mitigate the
inflexibility inherent in predetermined punishments.
B.

SYSTEM EFFICIENCY

Another policy common to large urban offices is System Efficiency.
A high volume caseload mandates the speedy and early disposition of as
many cases as possible. The existence of this policy usually indicates a
backlogged court and an overworked prosecutor's office with limited resources. At the time of the site visit, the Kings County (Brooklyn), New
York District Attorney's office processed more than 80,000 felony and
22 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12022, 12022.7 (West 1980).
23 MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.424(2) (Callaghan 1980).
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misdemeanor arrests each year. One of the top assistants in Brooklyn
pointed out that of those arrests, about 24,000 were on felony charges.
He stated that the office was "not looking to prosecute all cases-we're
looking for help in disposing of them." There was a consciousness in the
office that cases had to be disposed of in a reasonable, but efficient fashion. The tight, efficient organizational structure was the main reason
for success in this monumental task.
As is typical with System Efficiency, the policy articulations of the
Brooklyn District Attorney's office had a distinct management flavor.
The District Attorney and his chief assistants discussed the goals and the
objectives of the office in terms of organization control, efficient management, and accountability. 24 This pronounced management emphasis was to be expected from one of the largest prosecutor's offices in the
country. In 1978, almost three hundred Assistant District Attorneys
worked in the office.
However, a comparison by the research team between the articulated policy and the actual operation of the office revealed a startling
contrast: although the office had an expressed policy of System Efficiency, the overwhelming effect of both the volume of cases and a lack of
control over intake produced a dispositional pattern more consistent
with the Legal Sufficiency model. 25 The major impediment to System
24 It is noteworthy that in the interests of efficiency the Brooklyn District Attorney selected different organizational modes for different bureaus. Specialized bureaus exist to prosecute Supreme Court (felony trial court) cases involving Rackets, Narcotics, Major Offenses,
Homicide, and Economic Crimes and Consumer Fraud. With the exception of the Economic
Crimes and Consumer Fraud Bureau, these bureaus assign cases to individual assistants on a
trial team basis, thereby reducing the problems associated with the assembly-line case processing system ordinarily in use.
Some of the smaller bureaus have their own unit style internal organizational procedures
for handling cases. In Narcotics, for example, one group of attorneys handles investigations
and one group is assigned to trials. Homicide, Narcotics, and Rackets cases are assigned to
one Assistant District Attorney, who is responsible for it through all steps of the process. By
contrast, in the two largest bureaus in the office, Criminal Court and Supreme Court, attorneys are responsible for all cases heard in specified parts of the respective courts. Thus, in
these bureaus the typical case will be handled by several Assistant District Attorneys in the
course of its disposition.
25 Statistics from Brooklyn for the last half of 1978 reveal that the majority of cases (85%)
were disposed of at the Criminal Court (misdemeanor) level, through either a dismissal or a
plea of guilty. Thirty-nine percent resulted in dismissal while 46% ended with a guilty plea.
One reason given for such a high dismissal rate was that police filed cases with the Criminal
Court prior to scrutiny by the District Attorney's office.
This type of dispositional funnel resulted in little more than 8% of the cases being referred to the grand jury. Thousands of grand jury indictment cases ended with guilty pleas in
the Supreme Court. When trials occurred, convictions outnumbered acquittals in a ratio of
roughly two to one. In addition, 16% of the cases resulted in dismissals by the court, and 3.3%
resulted in supercession, consolidation, or abatement.
These dispositional statistics are not surprising when two factors are considered: the
sheer volume of cases processed and the prosecutor's lack of control over the charging deci-

MELLON,JACOBY, AND BREWER

[Vol. 72

Efficiency was that the prosecutor did not pick which cases to file; the
police did.
By tradition, the New York Police Department filed cases directly
with the Criminal Court without the prior approval of the Brooklyn
District Attorney. The police would arrest and book a suspect at any
one of several police stations which had lockup facilities. Once there,
the suspect could be held until his first appearance in Criminal Court
the next day. With the dispersal of detention facilities throughout
Brooklyn, it was difficult for the prosecutor to develop a functional intake and screening unit.
However, at the beginning of 1978 the Police Department consolidated booking activities in Brooklyn into one central precinct. This single act was enough to allow the prosecutor to create an intake unit with
a screening staff assigned to the precinct station. Designated the Early
Case Assessment Bureau, the new intake unit's primary function was to
review all felony arrests at the booking precinct and to set priorities for
26
prosecution.
The Early Case Assessment Bureau will permit the District Attorney to increase control over charging.2 7 Ultimately this should help the
office to achieve its efficiency goals. Of necessity, a System Efficiency
policy emphasizes pre-trial screening. The use of experienced assistants
at screening ensures that weak cases are removed from the system at the
earliest opportunity. Under this policy, the prosecutor continuously explores additional avenues for case dispositions, examines cases for their
plea bargaining potential, and extensively uses community resources, especially treatment and diversion programs. The goal is to reduce the
sion. Thus, the results anticipated under a Legal Sufficiency system are found. In Brooklyn
many cases were dismissed at the preliminary hearing in Criminal Court. Plea bargaining
was emphasized at all levels. However, the fact that many plea offers were withdrawn if not
accepted by trial date, further indicated the office's basic desire to be efficient even though
the circumstances at intake were not very supportive of this approach.
26 This initial classification of cases was, of course, entirely consistent with the System
Efficiency goals of the office. The case rating system designated each case as either strong or
weak on a scale of A to E, and identified the accusatory process to be used. A cases, the
strongest, went immediately to the grand jury for indictment. B cases, the slightly weaker
ones, were to proceed first through a preliminary hearing before an indictment was sought. C
cases were divided into: "C up" or "C down." Whether to proceed as a felony (up) or a
misdemeanor (down) was the first determination needed for these cases. D cases could be
reduced as part of a plea bargain, or reduced to a misdemeanor level for trial in the Criminal
Court. E cases, the weakest designations, were to be dismissed at the first appearance.
27 The initial effect of the screening unit was not to make accept/reject decisions. The
traditional roles and procedures of the police did not disappear overnight. Although the
prosecutor now had the option of refusing to prosecute a case altogether by notifying the
police officer that the case was too weak to pursue, this was rarely chosen as the means of
disposition. As a result the intake assistants filed the cases in almost every instance. Dismissals, if needed, occurred at the first appearance hearing.
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total number of cases that enter the system. At this time, the Brooklyn
office offers an excellent opportunity to observe the effect of making the
28
prosecutor a gatekeeper.
C.

DEFENDANT REHABILITATION-THE ENVIRONMENTALLY
PERMISSIBLE POLICY

The goals of a Defendant Rehabilitation policy are early diversion
of most defendants from the criminal justice system coupled with vigorous prosecution of those cases allowed in the system. These two goals
are entirely consistent since a repeat offender who commits serious
crimes has demonstrated that, for him at least, rehabilitative programs
are not effective.
Offices which adopt a Defendant Rehabilitation policy rely on noncriminal justice system resources and community support to assist in
moving eligible defendants out of the judicial and correctional systems.
This individualized defendant orientation makes this policy difficult, if
not impossible, to maintain in an assembly-line, high-volume court system.
A compatible environment in Boulder County, Colorado, made
possible this essentially humanitarian policy orientation. The university
dominated county 29 was the smallest of the jurisdictions studied, produced few serious or violent crimes, supported a liberal attitude toward
drug usage, and had defendants who generally could be treated in diversion and rehabilitation programs. Furthermore, according to the District Attorney, young professionals with a moderate to liberal attitude
toward the criminal justice system dominated the community and supported his philosophy.
The District Attorney explicitly expressed his concern about the
human consequences of the establishment of criminal records, particularly in the cases of young, non-violent, first offenders with otherwise
excellent chances of becoming useful and productive citizens. He noted
that criminal records in Colorado carry the risk of stigmatization for
extended periods prior to possible expungement-five years in the case
of misdemeanors, seven years in felony cases.3 0 At the same time, he
observed the relative lack of success of the Colorado penal system in
achieving rehabilitation objectives, while other modes of treatment ap28 Unfortunately, the procedure was still so new at the time of our visit that we were
unable to analyze its effects or the full implications of its power.
29 Twenty-five percent of the population of the City of Boulder and 11% of the county are
young university students. Interview with Alexander M. Hunter, District Attorney, 20th Judicial District, Boulder, Colorado (August 9, 1978).
30 CoLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-308 (1973).
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peared somewhat more successful.3 ' During his tenure in office, however, he became aware of a persistent insistence by Boulder residents for
accountability in the criminal justice system. As he put it, "I can see it
and feel it in the courthouse." His philosophy became more conservative. Although "less and less patient" with repeat offenders and crimes
of violence, he continued to be attuned sensitively to the problems of
first offenders.
Early in 1978, the District Attorney instituted a plea bargaining
reform.3 2 Prior to that time, the policy of the office was to overcharge
by filing multiple counts to be negotiated later. Under the reform,
charging became the central stage of the prosecutorial process. The District Attorney viewed accurate charging, that is, charging that took into
account both the facts of an offense and the equities involved in a case,
as essential to the sound administration of justice. Consequently, the
"plea bargaining reform" program encouraged a shift from negotiating
the charge during the course of a case through the courts, to an early
and more-or-less unilateral determination of an accurate charge based
on all available information.
D.

TRIAL SUFFICIENCY

In contrast to the first three policies, in a Trial Sufficiency office a
case is accepted for prosecution only if the prosecutor is willing to have
it judged on its merits and expects a conviction at trial. One researcher
in the current study described the Trial Sufficiency policy's impact in
the Louisiana office as: "If you go to court as a defendant in New Orleans, you'd better bring your toothbrush because you're going to jail." If
a constitutional question is discovered at screening which would ad31 The Colorado State Penitentiary experiences a 66% recidivism rate while probationers
in Boulder County have a recidivism rate between 8 and 15%. The recidivism rate in cases in
which deferred sentencing has been employed is 2-3%.
32 The key mechanism for implementation of the plea bargaining reform was a daily
Staffing and Charging Conference attended by all Deputy District Attorneys not in court.
Defense attorneys, law enforcement officers, and representatives of diversion programs also
participated. The purpose of the conference was to make the basic decision of how to proceed
with a case. As the District Attorney told an interviewer "Once a charge is filed, we say this is
it. Plead to this charge or go to trial." The District Attorney defined a number of contingencies upon which exceptions might rest including: 1) nonavailability of a witness, 2) a case
weakened significantly by the granting of a pretrial motion, 3) desirability of obtaining a
defendant's agreement to testify against a more important defendant--the so-called "big fish"
exception, 4) where a defendant was charged in another or several other jurisdictions in addition to Boulder, 5) the equity case in which later information indicates an appropriate disposition was something less than the original charge.
With the rehabilitation of non-violent first offenders as a goal, the District Attorney's
office made liberal use of release on recognizance, diversion, deferred sentencing, and, on rare
occasions, deferred prosecution. However, these rehabilitative programs were not used in
cases involving violent or repeat offenders.
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versely affect the convictability of a defendant, the case well might be
dropped.
In 1974, during his first campaign for the Office of District Attorney, the future prosecutor of New Orleans perceived that the voters of
his parish 33 wanted "criminal types" put in jail. True to his campaign
promises, upon assuming office he implemented a Trial Sufficiency approach to prosecution.
The effective operation of a Trial Sufficiency policy requires organization and discipline. In addition, competent police reporting is required, as is a cooperative police-prosecutor relationship, so that the
merits of a case can be ascertained quickly and decisions made in a
nonadversarial environment. Since the initial charge forecloses most options under this policy, careless decisionmaking cannot be tolerated.
The policy also requires alternatives to prosecution because many cases
are not prosecuted. Court capacity is an important factor under a policy which expects that once a case is accepted it goes to trial. Finally,
strict management controls are essential with experienced personnel assigned to the screening and initial charging level so that once the decision is made, charges ultimately are not changed or dropped.
The new prosecutor all but eliminated plea bargaining, targeted
career criminals, created a screening and intake division staffed by the
most experienced prosecutors, 34 and generally changed the charging
standard. He required that all cases with less than a reasonable chance
of successful prosecution be rejected. The office had extensive feedback,
review, and approval mechanisms. These enabled the District Attorney
to monitor the flow of cases through the office and helped to insure adherence to his policies. The allocation of resources also clearly reflected
his intent. He assigned the most experienced assistants to the intake
unit to make the majority of the discretionary decisions. The least experienced assistants went to trial court where they had little freedom to
35
plea bargain and dismiss cases.
33 Parish is the term used to describe county-like governmental subdivisions in Louisiana.
34 The Screening Division examined all cases and had responsibility for charging accurately all cases accepted and all offenses committed. Nine experienced assistants staffed the
division with assistance from four investigators as well as paraprofessionals and clerical personnel. In June, 1978, all Screening Division Assistants had served at least 12 to 18 months in
the office. All had trial experience and the Division Chief had been in the office four years
with previous experience in private practice. The Division assigned one assistant to armed
robbery cases, one to homicides and rapes, one to narcotics, one to vice cases, and four to
general duty covering all other cases. All declined cases had to be approved by the Division
Chief. Each Screening Assistant also tried one or two cases a month, a Division requirement.
35 New Orleans has a unified court system in which the District Attorney's office operates
two Trial District Court Divisions, each covering five courtrooms and headed by a co-chief.
These divisions prosecute both felonies and misdemeanors, but most of their work involves
felony trials. In each court section, a more experienced attorney is teamed with a less exper-
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The office also maintained a Post-Conviction Tracking Unit
(PCTU) which served a dual function as a post-disposition case review
entity and as the organizational unit responsible for following up on
post-conviction proceedings such as parole and pardon hearings. In the
first respect, this special unit reviewed all closed files. The PCTU attorney reported any case nolleprossed without approval to the first Assistant
for remedial action. In the second respect, the Chief of the PCTU represented the District Attorney at parole and pardon hearings. The office
opposed parole or pardon petitions from all career criminals and as a
regular practice reviewed the cases of all felons up for parole or pardon.3 6 By its opposition to applications from serious or dangerous
criminals, the office was consistent with the "get tough" attitude of the
Trial Sufficiency policy at intake.
E.

UNSTABLE POLICY-AN ATTEMPT AT CERTAINTY OF PUNISHMENT
IN A CONTEXT OF LEGAL SUFFICIENCY

The chronicle of policy and procedural changes of King County
(Seattle), Washington, illustrates the importance of policy implementation in a stable and consistent manner.
Twice during his eight years in office the Prosecuting Attorney of
King County made major changes in his charging policy. The first occurred shortly after his election in 1971. His predecessor, whom he had
ienced one. Before assignment to District Court trial duties assistants are assigned to either
the Magistrate or Juvenile Divisions. The most experienced served either in the Screening
Division or in supervisory positions.
36 At the time of the BSSR inquiry, New Orleans was the only district attorney's office
participating in this study which offered parole or pardon opposition of career criminals on a
routine basis.
The following table outlines the research teams' findings related to post-conviction practices. (Table Source: PAP, supra note 10, at 280; Ex. SUM., supra note 10, at 53.)
POSTCONVICTION ACTIvrrY IN WHICH THE PROSECUTOR ROUTINELY PARTICIPATES
Presntence
Inv-tigation

Wayne County, MI .....
Kings County, NY ......
Dade County, FL .......
San Diego County, CA ..
King County, WA ......
Orleans Parish, LA .....
Lake County, IN .......
Salt Lake County, UT ...
Norfolk, VA ...........
Boulder County, CO ....
a

Exception -

Sentence
Reommendation

No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes

No
Yes
No
No a
Yes
Yes
No
No a
Yes
Yes

local or state incarceration

b Attempting to institute
c Appeals duties shared with Attorney General

Diverion or
Retitution

No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes

AppeaL

Yes
Yes
Yesc
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes

Parole or Pardon
Opposition

Expungmwt

No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No b
No
No

No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
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defeated at the polls, operated the office under a strict set of charging
standards very similar to a Trial Sufficiency policy. Cases were not
prosecuted unless a conviction was almost certain. As one senior deputy
described it, "the policy imposed an incredibly high standard for filing.
The test was 'Can you win this case at trial?' It was a cautious, conservative approach." Under the new administration, the question was
no longer "Can you win this case?" but rather "Can this case survive
motions?"
As a policy matter, the office minimized the number of cases declined, keeping that figure below 10-12%. A senior deputy explained
that "the refusal of this office to decline many cases is a reflection of fine
police work, as well as the willingness of the prosecutor to take and try
tough cases." The change in intake standards created a significant increase in the number of cases filed. In turn this created increased pressure for expeditious case dispositions. Disposition by an early negotiated
plea was an acceptable strategy having judicial approval. Judge shopping was possible since any defendant who wished to plead guilty could
choose the judge who would sentence him. 37 There were other means of

expeditiously disposing of cases (such as not charging first offenders arrested for non-violent crimes) but they could not equal the power of the
inducement offered by judge shopping. Thus, the change in the charging policy permitted a larger number of cases to be accepted for prosecution and disposed of with no increase in processing time.
While campaigning for re-election in 1974, the Prosecuting Attorney discovered that the voters' attitudes toward crime and punishment
differed decidedly from his own. During his first term, he maintained
an "individual treatment" philosophy about criminal offenders. However, the electorate seemed to believe individual treatment of serious offenders only resulted in a spiralling increase in crime committed most
often by repeat offenders. After his re-election in 1975, the Prosecutor
replaced the treatment approach with a new "certainty of punishment"
style. This approach calls for the imposition of specific criminal penalties as punishment for certain crimes upon adjudication. The concept of
proportionality which dictates a punishment in direct measure to the
37 The Prosecuting Attorney's 1978 Budget Submission to the King County Council discussed the value of this inducement to plead:
'Judge shopping' allowed defendants who entered a guilty plea before a trial date was
assigned to essentially select their sentencing judge. Guilty pleas entered after a trial
date was assigned resulted in a much less favorable sentencing judge being assigned.
This created a very powerful inducement for the entry of early guilty pleas. Our office
received substantial benefits from this policy since cases are not assigned to individual
trial deputies until after a trial date was assigned. Thus, cases which plead before being
assigned do not become a part of the trial deputies' caseload.
C.

BAYLEY, SEATrLE:

BUDGET SUBMISSION 41

OFFICE OF THE KING COUNTY

(1978).

PROSECUTING ATTORNEY,

1978
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seriousness of the offense committed is an important element of the certainty of punishment philosophy. As a result, the defendant's past criminal behavior is of critical importance. 3a The Prosecutor saw this
certainty of punishment stance as a device to reduce and control the
exercise of discretion by both the police and the assistant prosecutors.
His view was that: "One of the major reasons for the exercise of the
most important discretionary power of police and prosecutors-the
power not to arrest and not to prosecute-is the desire to avoid what are
perceived to be unduly harsh consequences that could follow from an
arrest or prosecution.

' 39

So that the new policy would not significantly increase the total
workload, less serious cases were expedited by filing in the lower, District
Court.4 0 Priorities and charging standards were developed to govern
the filing and disposition of cases. Discretionary authority was reduced;
decisions were strictly governed by standards for charging and case dispositions.
To support this new activity and to ensure accurate and uniform
charging decisions, the Prosecuting Attorney created a filing unit and
staffed it on a rotating basis with experienced deputies who were relieved of trial responsibility during their time in the unit.4 1 For high
impact crimes such as rape, robbery, or residential burglary, charges
could not be reduced, counts dismissed, or special allegations dropped
except in exceptional cases. The same inflexible rules governed the handling of assaults and homicides. Assistants also followed strict standards
governing the use of sentence recommendations. Even first offenders
participating in high impact crimes had "loss of liberty" included as
4 2
part of a sentence recommendation.
These new policies might have been implemented smoothly except
38 However, as will be discussed later, sentence recommendations as to loss of liberty in
certain cases involving non-violent crimes applied even to first-time offenders.
39 Bayley, Good Intenlions Gone Awq--A ProposalFor Fundamental Change in CrinalSentencing, 51 WASH. L. REv. 529, 559 (1976).
40 Washington (like California) has a criminal code that permits the filing of certain felonies in either a lower court or in the state court of general jurisdiction. The new Washington
State Criminal Code became effective July 1, 1976. It reduced many felonies to misdemeanors, which in Seattle are tried in the District Court.
41 The unit was responsible for the charging decision and held accountable for following
the guidelines. The charging decision standards and procedures were spelled out with great
specificity in a 50-page document. With a case intake acceptance rate of 88-90%, one could
question the need of staffing this unit with senior trial assistants who could only make restricted discretionary decisions, especially when the number of trials was increasing.
42 The lowest priority was given to crimes involving less than $500 such as certain thefts,
thefts of credit cards, and some forgeries. Joyriding, under certain conditions, and a variety
of marijuana and other drug crimes involving the possession of small amounts of contraband
also were classified, generally, as low priority crimes.
Even for these low priority crimes, depending upon the requirements of the law and the
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that the 1974 elections stunned the court and forced a major change,
thus setting the stage for the failure of the prosecutorial policy. At the
same time the prosecutor learned the electorate wanted him to "get
tough" on crime, two King County Superior Court judges lost re-election bids. Both were reputedly "soft" on criminals and known for giving
light sentences to defendants who pled guilty. In 1975, as a result, the
Superior Court in King County abolished judge shopping.
This action effectively brought plea bargaining to a standstill. The
assistants, circumscribed by the new inflexible charging standards, could
not make concessions. Indeed, they were hamstrung by standards which
required sentence recommendations including the loss of liberty in certain cases. Any negotiated pleas had to be reached within the bounds of
the standards.
Trials were the only alternative. The loss of a friendly, lenient
judge of the defendant's own selection left the defense with few incentives to bargain early, if at all. As a result, although the volume at intake did not change, the dispositional outlets were reduced as the
incentives to plead diminished. In fact, the system changed to present
an environment that encouraged delay either in coming to trial or in
43
entering a guilty plea on the chance that the case would break down.
The early pleas obtained routinely in the old system precluded the
need for omnibus or other evidentiary hearings. Now, however, as the
cases aged with pleas not entered until much later in the process, there
was a concomitant increase In the number of pre-trial hearings-all of
which required additional preparation and attendance time for the
prosecutors. These changes and the basic incompatability of the procedures developed and implemented, produced an unstable system-one
which could not be maintained over time without changing. While
each of the process steps appeared to be proper as implemented (with
the possible exception of the resource allocation inconsistency-using
experienced prosecutors, at intake), once assembled the parts created an
unstable whole.
The floodgates at intake should not have been opened, that is, more
cases should not have been admitted to the system, without increased
dispositional capacity to accomodate the extra volume. Both the abolidiscretion of the prosecutor, the punishment length could vary significantly and the location
of imprisonment could vary from the local jail to the state penitentiary.
43 The changing policy and the increased workload was readily apparent to the trial assistants. One stated, "You can't do as good a job as formerly." In the past, new assistants first
assigned to prosecuting felonies were aided by senior assistants both at trials and also in interviewing witnesses and checking subpoena lists. "Now, young assistants are winging felony
trials. I perceive a great increase in the number of acquittals and hung juries. The office
policy is such that hung juries are not considered a loss."
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tion of judge shopping and the imposition of charging guidelines diminished the use of pleas. Even if the practice of judge shopping had
continued, the prosecutor's certainty of punishment stance could not
have been maintained. The system had to change eventually because
the increase in case volume magnified the case backlog.
A limited change did occur. The Prosecuting Attorney permitted
his chief assistants to adjust the system by deciding what was an expedited case (and hence, subject to lower court processing) and what was
not (those cases which had to be filed in the felony court). By varying
the definitions, volume increases could be counteracted at least on a
short term basis.
F.

THE TRANSFER STYLE

The office that does not control case intake nor make the charging
decision presents a different style of prosecution from an office with active and plenary charging. The term "transfer" implies either that the
prosecutor gave up the charging function or had it taken away. The
reason he does not control charging often results from the combination
of a complex number of factors and influences, some structural, some
voluntary, and some traditional. This so-called "transfer" does not necessarily produce detrimental effects upon either the activities of or efficiency of the prosecutor's office. The State Attorney's office in Dade
County (Miami) Florida is a transfer style office. Prior to the spring of
1972, the State Attorney maintained a separate intake unit staffed with
senior experienced attorneys. Police officers and detectives filed cases
directly with the intake unit assistant prosecutors and occasionally with
other assistants in the office when intake prosecutors were unavailable.
The State Attorney gave high priority to cases involving incarcerated defendants who could not make bail. However, under the jail system then in effect, subjects could be held for as long as thirty days prior
to the filing of charges or any judicial review of their incarceration. In
the spring of 1971, a class action suit 44 was filed in the United States
District Court in Miami against the State Attorney and other officials of
the Dade County criminal justice system. The plaintiffs were persons
incarcerated in the county jail charged with various crimes and awaiting
trial under pending informations. None of the plaintiffs had been accorded a preliminary hearing. They sought injunctive relief and a declaration requiring a preliminary hearing before a committing magistrate
on probable cause after arrest and before trial pursuant to the fourth
and fourteenth amendments of the Constitution.
The District Court found the Dade County practices unconstitu44 Pugh v. Rainwater, 332 F. Supp. 1107 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
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tional on the grounds alleged in the plaintiffs' petition, and subsequently adopted a plan calling for adversarial preliminary hearings to
be held shortly after arrest and incarceration.4 5 Although the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stayed the plan 46 pending
appeal by the State Attorney, the Dade County Circuit Court and other
involved parties implemented a proposal of their own. This plan used
the Dade County Jail for the booking of all persons arrested in any of
the twenty-seven municipalities in Dade County on state charges. A
standardized Arrest Form used at intake became the charging document
for preliminary hearing purposes. Thus, the State Attorney suddenly
had no control over charging at intake; this was effectively transferred to
the police. The court acted on police arrest charges until the preliminary hearing. The prosecutor first saw the case and had the opportunity
to exercise his discretionary authority at the preliminary hearing. This
procedure is similar to the traditional pattern in Brooklyn, New York,
under the old Legal Sufficiency system previously discussed.
Despite the United States Supreme Court ruling in the case 47 that
the adversarial hearing and the other "panoply of adversary safeguards" 48 ordered by the District Court were not constitutionally mandated, the preliminary hearing system in Dade County remained in
effect under the local court rule. The State Attorney continued to process cases after intake and charging by police officers although he could
49
have resumed responsibility for intake if he had so desired.
The prosecutor in Norfolk, Virginia also reacted to a charging decision initially made by the police. As in Miami, he too could dispose of
weak cases before they reached trial. In the Norfolk Commonwealth
Attorney's office a mere fourteen assistants processed about 4500 felony
cases a year. Yet, despite the large caseload, the office had no intake or
case screening unit and traditionally the police, not the prosecutor,
made the charging decisions. Within twenty-four hours of the arrest of a
suspect a first appearance was scheduled before a magistrate. This practice developed over time in Norfolk, and was not originally the conscious
choice of either the police department or the Commonwealth Attorney.
Traditions like these define the limits of the power of the respective com45 Pugh v. Rainwater, 336 F. Supp. 490, 491 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
46 The stay was by unreported order, as noted in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 109

(1974).
47 Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103.
48 Id. at 119.
49 At the time of the site visit, police filed the initial charge in Miami. However, the
prosecutor could react at an early time by screening cases. The prosecutor could question the
arresting officer and/or detectives as well as the victim and other witnesses prior to the preliminary hearing. Police charges could be, and quite often were, amended by the prosecutor
at the preliminary hearing.
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ponents of the criminal justice system and create environments wherein
procedures are questioned rarely and more workable alternatives sought
infrequently.
Two factors explain why screening could be non-existent yet not
detrimental in Norfolk. First, there was a strong tradition for the prosecutor to enter a nolleprosequ" at the first appearance if the case was weak.
This had almost the same effect as rejecting the case at intake. Some
prosecutors might interpret such actions as indicating a weakness in
their operation or as an indicator of poor charging decisions. This was
not the attitude in Norfolk. There was system-wide recognition that
weak cases should not enter the system and that it was the proper role of
the prosecutor to eliminate cases in this manner. The second factor
counteracting the effects of no screening was plea bargaining which occurred early in the process, thereby disposing of many cases at first ap50
pearance.
G.

THE UNIT STYLE

As in a transfer style office a shift of decisionmaking power occurs
in offices that delegate the charging authority to each assistant. In such
offices, the individual prosecutors receive little or no guidance for or review of their decisions. The original framework for the current study
assumed the existence of an. office policy implemented by rules and procedures and controlled by management with review and approval mechanisms. Where there was no indication that the prosecutor attempted to
guide the decisions made by his assistants, but rather delegated control
of the decisionmaking process at intake to his assistants, BSSR researchers questioned the effect of less bureaucratic and more collegial organization on consistency and uniformity in decisionmaking. Additional
questions covered the degree to which policies can be informally developed and communicated in the absence of more formal transmissions
and expressions of policy.
The two most striking features of the prosecution system in Lake
County, Indiana, (a jurisdiction which includes the city of Gary) were
the part-time status of the fifty-attorney staff and the process by which
the prosecutor established control late in the trial stage over a decentralized, autonomously operating system. The Prosecuting Attorney staffed
courts in at least seven locations. Furthermore, the court system had
four different types of courts for criminal case processing.
50 The office used plea negotiation to dispose of more than 90% of all cases in Norfolk.
There were few offers to reduce the top count of the charge. The Commonwealth Attorney's
office usually offered to drop additional counts in the indictment in return for an agreement
by the defendant to plead to the top count. Trials in Norfolk, both bench and jury, occurred
in only about 180 cases out of the total 4,500 felonies processed in the office.
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This disparate and complex court system adversely affected the
transmittal of policy. Working part-time, the assistant prosecuting attorneys operated more as contractors to the office than as staff members.
There was little mobility between courts or parts of the office. Consequently, there waFas little integration of the staff into an "office," and
individual discretion and autonomy thrived. The office reflected a "unit
style" of decisionmaking as each assistant operated as his own policymaking unit. However, the centralization of plea bargaining under the
supervision of three senior assistant prosecuting attorneys gave consistency to negotiated dispositions. This procedure also had the effect of
imposing uniformity on the diverse decisions made at intake.
With no control over intake and despite a substantial desire to plea
bargain, one out of seven arrests ultimately resulted in a trial. A critical
variable beyond the control of the prosecutor had an important effect on
this trial rate. Determinate sentencing, which is in effect in Indiana,
greatly restricted the type of bargain that the court would accept relative to length of sentence. 5 ' Thus, suspects had little incentive to plead
guilty to the crime as charged since the alternative of going to trial with
flat sentencing did not result in any more severe punishment than that
52
imposed with a negotiated plea.
The County Attorney's office in Salt Lake County, Utah, afforded
another perspective of the unit style decisionmaking process operating
under vastly different circumstances than those observed in Lake
County, Indiana. In Salt Lake, the Attorney's office demonstrated the
consequences of a collegial approach to prosecution with little centralized control over either staff or case flow through the office. Autonomy
in decisionmaking made office policies difficult to implement initially or
to monitor and maintain.
Twenty-four assistant prosecutors worked in the Criminal Division
at the time of this inquiry. The Chief Criminal Deputy believed that
each attorney should be competent enough to make his own decisions
almost from the day hired. Attorneys were assigned case screening on a
rotating basis as their caseload permitted. Individual attorneys made
decisions to accept or reject. Once an attorney accepted a case, he assumed total responsibility for its trial and disposition, barring unanticipated conflicts. This system of prosecution ensured that decisionmaking
on individual cases was exercised by the same assistant.
The system in Salt Lake City did not permit a superior to monitor
51 Or so the Prosecuting Attorney indicated as a possible explanation of the high trial
rate. See IND. CODE §§ 35-50-1-1, et seq. (West 1978).
52 Contrast this rationale with that articulated by prosecutors in San Diego County in
connection with plea bargaining and the effect on it of determinate sentencing, in section IV,
A supra.
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variations of prosecutorial treatment from one case to another, or
among assistants. There was no articulated office charging policy. With
discretion delegated autonomously, any policy, if it existed, probably
53
developed informally.
Limited court capacity was an important environmental factor
which affected the Attorney's Office in Salt Lake. 54 A single judge tried
all felony cases. Thus, assistants favored negotiated pleas 55 in an attempt to lighten the docket. Yet, despite the high number of pleas, the
County Attorney's office is very trial oriented. Every assistant is ex56
pected to be able to try a case within days after joining the staff.
Yet Salt Lake City prosecutors are remarkably similar in their perceptions and decisionmaking. This similarity may be attributed to a
number of factors: the socialization of the group; the small size of the
office; and the use of the Prosecutors Management Information System
(PROMIS) 57 which made more information available to each member
of the staff. The County Attorney had a strong interest in conforming to
PROMIS' recommended guidelines. As a consequence each assistant
felt subtle pressure to be in line with general averages and disposition
rates. The result was an office exhibiting few outward controls, yet possessing a good deal of internal consistency.
In contrast with the findings in other sites, it seems that the unit
53 Nevertheless, there seemed to be a high degree of uniformity of thinking among staff
attorneys. Researchers believe this is attributable in part to collegiality. Policy resulted from
the least structured types of communications, that is, the unwritten messages transmitted in
non-articulated settings. See note 15 supra.
54 Since the inclination of the office was toward trials and not pleas, it was not surprising
to note that the County Attorney has consistently, but unsuccessfully (save for one occasion),
advocated increasing the number of judges to hear felony matters.
One senior deputy indicated in an interview that on one occasion, the County Attorney
had been successful. He said that in November, 1977, only two felony trials were held during
the entire month. The County Attorney's severe criticism of the court at that time resulted in
several additional judges being assigned to felony trials and the "heat" being placed on the
County Attorney. His office responded by trying 40 cases during a following month. The
senior deputy indicated that this was a rare occurrence, and that usually "we're only trying
five to ten cases a month."
55 Plea negotiations started in earnest after the filing of a bill of information. Although
official limits circumscribe the duration of the plea bargaining period, unofficial plea negotiations continue until the very day of trial.
56 A deputy who had a bench trial on his second day in the office, and his first jury trial
within a month, characterized his experience as a baptism by fire. He noted that he had been
"burned to the ground" by judges on several occasions.
57 PROMIS is perhaps the best known of the prosecutorial information systems. For discussion of another system known as the Case Management System, in use in the Suffolk
County (Boston) District Attorney's Office in Massachusetts, see Lasky, Murray & Ratledge,
Automated Court Case Management in the ftosecutors Oftce, TRIAL, Feb. 1978, at 36. PROMIS is
either in use or planned for use in almost one hundred jurisdictions.
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style of prosecution, both in Salt Lake and in Lake County evolved by
default rather than through deliberate planning.
V.

CONTINUING ASPECTS OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT

The research described above supported two major activities: first,
the identification of prosecutorial policies and the determination of how
they are implemented and transmitted based on the study of the ten
previously discussed prosecutors' offices, and second, the development of
a standard set of criminal cases to provide a quantitative measure of
prosecutorial policy and decisionmaking consistency.
The standard set of cases covered the three primary variables used
by prosecutors-the seriousness of the offense, the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history, and the evidentiary strength of the case. This
last category led to the development of a conceptual framework for legal
and evidentiary matters. For the research, evidentiary strength was separated into four components: (1) the inherent complexity of the offense;
(2) constitutional questions; (3) the nature of the evidence-both physical and testimonial; and (4) the circumstances of the arrest.
Using a standard set of thirty cases, 855 attorneys in fifteen jurisdictions nationwide 58 set priorities for urgency of prosecution, predicted
dispositions, and- recommended sanctions. Research to date indicates
that nearly all prosecutors set the same priorities. As would be expected
in a rational system, procedures differ according to the priorities set for
the cases being processed. The most urgent cases represent the most
serious crimes. They receive the most attention and when necessary.
have the largest dedication of resources. Similarly, trivial cases receive
the least attention and minimal effort is attached to their disposition.
.The establishment of priorities for prosecution produces a strong
ordering effect on dispositions. The lowest ranked cases tend to be either declined at intake or pled out as misdemeanors early in the process.
The cases in the middle ranked group usually are disposed of by pleas,
some reduced and some at the original charge. The high priority group
generally goes to trial. These results were found universally throughout
the United States among all of the prosecutors tested: In a reasonable
and rational system, this result is expected.
There are three individual factors which assume different roles at
58 Prosecutors in the following places participated in the testing of the Standard Set of
Cases: King County (Seattle), Washington; Hennepin County (Minneapolis), Minnesota;
Jackson County (Kansas City), Missouri; Kings County (Brooklyn), New York; Wilmington,
Delaware; New Orleans, Louisiana; Salt Lake City, Utah; Montgomery County, Maryland;
Lake County (Gary), Indiana; Polk County (Des Moines), Iowa; Baton Rouge, Louisiana;
Wayne County (Detroit), Michigan; Erie County (Buffalo), New York Maricopa County
(Phoenix), Arizona; Dade County (Miami), Florida.
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each step of the process and for each of the major dispositional decisions:
first, the seriousness of the offense; second, the legal and evidentiary
strength of the case; and third, the defendant's criminal history. The
seriousness of the offense is the most consistently important factor of all
three, and with few exceptions, influences most decisions. At intake the
legal and evidentiary strength of the case is the primary factor upon
which the charging decision is based. In some jurisdictions this factor is
supplemented either by a consideration of the seriousness of the offenseor the criminality of the defendant. For example, in Kings County
(Brooklyn), New York, the charging decisions made in about forty thousand felony arrest cases are based on both evidentiary and criminality
factors. This leads to the conclusion that in high volume systems some
selectivity is introduced early in the process to sort cases into expected
dispositional routings. The extra dimension is the nature of the defendant; thus, for cases where the decision to accept or reject is marginal, the
past crimes of the defendant may be the critical variable. In other jurisdictions, where volume is not as high, the legal and evidentiary factor is
the primary criterion.
In addition, evidentiary strength plays an important role at trial.
Generally, a disposition by a plea is more likely to occur as the evidentiary strength of the case is reduced. Conversely, the stronger the case,
the more likely it is to go to trial. Also influencing this decision is the
defendant's record. The more criminality, that is, the longer the record
and the more serious the past crimes, the less likely a plea. With respect
to expected sanctions, the defendant's criminal history is consistently the
single most important factor considered when making the decision to
incarcerate.
The general decisionmaking pattern that emerges is one which relies on the seriousness of the offense and the legal and evidentiary
strength of the case for decisions made at intake, accusation, and trial.
The defendant's record has importance during trial and post-conviction
proceedings, but rarely at intake. This is important because it confirms
the viability of our principles ofjustice. Moreover, it shows that a significant amount of the variation in decisions can be explained by these
legitimate factors which operate within rational relationships.
The research also reveals that assistant prosecutors generally make
decisions in a manner consistent with their policy leaders. These results
are heartening since, over time, organizations should establish routine
and stable systems of operation. In fact, if this were not the result and
consistency in decisionmaking was not high, then one would expect to
see daily displays of chaos and conflicts. Instead, as the discussion of
offices participating in this study reveals, prosecutors are an adaptable
group who adjust their policies to meet changing environmental con-
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straints. As the standard case set research reveals, the assistants generally tend to follow their policy leaders.
In the broadest sense, this study considers the extent to which prosecution controls or influences the uniform and equal distribution ofjustice and concludes that it is inherently inappropriate to evaluate any
agency or function on the basis of factors beyond its control. Furthermore, it is unrealistic for anyone to conclude from this study that any
one policy is best for either curbing or promoting prosecutorial discretion. Accordingly, this Article does not draw any broad normative generalizations.
An awareness of a prosecutor's policy can change dramatically the
interpretation of statistical data from any given office. In Table A, note
that there were twice as many trials completed in New Orleans in a
given year as there were in Brooklyn. Yet, police in Brooklyn made
nearly three times as many arrests as police made in a year in New Orleans. If one examines the bottom line, the ratio of trials to intake of
cases, a great variety of conclusions could be drawn. Whatever conjectures or interpretations one might make would be inappropriate and
probably erroneous unless one examined the figures in the context of, or
with an awareness of the prosecutorial policy in effect in each office.
TABLE A
SELECTED WORKLOAD AND DISPOSITIONS
FOR THREE SITES59
NEW ORLEANS

SALT LAKE CrTy

BROOKLYN

Police Arrests*

8,982

9,802

39,500

Decline to Prosecute

3,919

1,164

1,671

43.6

11.9

4.2

5,568

1,497

3,694

1 to 2

1 to 7

I to 11

INTAKE

Percent of Intake
TRIALS

Total Felony Court Dispositions
Ratio of Felony Court Cases Disposed
to Intake

1,069

110

525

Ratio to Felony Court Dispositions

1 to 5

1 to 14

1 to 7

Ratio to Intake

I to 8

1 to 89

1 to 75

Number of Trials Completed

*

Arrest figures include felony and misdemeanors for New Orleans and Salt Lake City; felonies only for Brooklyn.

59 Table Source: PAP, sufira note 10, at 371.
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The numbers suggest that more cases come into (or perhaps are in)
the system than go out. One must keep in mind that for the years shown
in the table there were existing cases in each jurisdiction's system at the
beginning of the year. For example, in New Orleans there appear to be
more trials than there were cases accepted for prosecution. Obviously, a
number of trials resulted from cases accepted for prosecution in the previous year(s).
Thus, comparisons should not be made without determining, first,
the policy and goals of the offices; second, their effect on dispositional
patterns; and third, the backlog of cases. For example, the high ratio of
jury trials in New Orleans is an expected consequence of the charging
standards and the constraints placed on plea bargaining. To compare
this ratio with that of Brooklyn, (which must rely on plea bargaining to
dispose of the volume and minimize trials to keep the backlog under
control) is clearly meaningless. Each office is attempting to achieve
something different. Brooklyn, with three hundred assistants and approximately 24,000 felony arrests annually, shifted from a Legal Sufficiency stance to a System Efficiency policy. (The 1977 data presented
above can be interpreted as resulting from this former Legal Sufficiency
policy.) New Orleans figures reflect the dispositional pattern of a Trial
Sufficiency office-where cases are accepted with the expectation that
they will be sustained at trial. The one out of eighty-nine ratio displayed in Salt Lake City is eminently reasonable once one realizes that
only one judge hears cases on a regular basis. Thus, in Salt Lake City,
trials were an exceptional dispositional route.
The real lesson here is that discretion is not the issue. Rather, prosecutors and their critics alike should recognize that distinctive environments (community differences) create significant variations in
approaches to crime and prosecution. These differences can be understood, minimized, explained, or controlled by careful attention to
prosecutorial policy.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The prosecutor is a resourceful creature. He has adapted to his
many areas of operation by seizing those factors under his control and
refining their uses to such a highly developed level that they mitigate the
adverse effects of the environment. He has been able to achieve some
level of organizational and functional sophistication, not always deliberately, but sometimes intuitively. His wide-ranging discretionary power
is a significant factor in his survival. The very power so often subject to
criticism contains the key to his success. He can make policy and pursue
as a primary goal rehabilitation, punishment, or efficiency, by letting his
discretionary decisions reflect these goals. He can manage his resources
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to support these objectives by distributing his personnel to ensure that
the charging decisions reflect his priorities, and that dispositions occur as
he expects them. He can assign to these areas the more experienced or
the least experienced personnel as he determines. The organizational
and management structure of his office becomes the primary means of
insuring conformance with his policy and achieving the desired results.
The ultimate test for whether a prosecutor's office is applying its efforts
in a uniform and consistent manner must rely on first identifying what
the prosecutor is attempting to achieve, then testing whether the justice
within this context is distributed in an equal, fair, and consistent fashion. We now have the tools with which to test and results which show
that prosecutors throughout the United States appear to operate consistently and with uniformity in distributing justice.60

60 An empirical analysis of the discretion of federal prosecutors, in some respects parallel
to our own, has recently been published. Frase, The Deciston to File FederalCriminal Charges: A
QuantitativeStudy of ProsecutorTalDiscretion, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 246 (1980). This study focused
on one jurisdiction, the United States Attorney in the Northern District of Illinois. However,
it dealt primarily with the reasons for a decision not to prosecute a crime, and the categories
of crime dealt with, and did not emphasize (as this article did) the organizational style of the
office.

